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Federal policy has encouraged hospitals to provide certain quality outcomes and cost
containment. Hospitals have responded by forming physician hospital organizations in
attempts to achieve quality outcomes and capture reimbursements. At the same time, federal
policy has awarded hospitals with nonprofit status with the requirement to provide
community benefits in exchange for the tax exemption they receive. With the formation of
physician hospital organizations, there remains the question of whether hospitals are
achieving desired quality metrics and whether hospitals are financially viable. There is also
public and media interest recently regarding whether nonprofit hospitals fulfill their
obligations for community benefit in line with the large tax exemption they receive. This
study attempted to understand whether the hospital physician arrangements within nonprofit
hospitals influence the hospitals’ quality, financial health, and any unintended effects there
may be on community benefit expenditures. Data from the American Hospital Association
and the tax return 990 schedule H was used to understand the types of hospital physician
arrangements and to assess whether there was an association with nonprofit spending on
quality, financial health and community benefit expenditures. This study showed that there is
an association with higher Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 day mortality rates and Central
Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection scores with physician hospital organizations with high
integration; an undesirable outcome. High integration involves more physician and hospital
economic, administrative, and group involvement and more shared accountability. This study
also showed that there is an association with these physician hospital organizations and lower
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 day readmission rates, higher operating margin, and higher
community benefits. No clear direction is apparent for the federal government regarding
payer policies causing unintended consequences regarding hospital community benefits
spending; however, the formation of physician hospital organizations with high integration
may not have the quality metrics desired. The federal government will have to consider its
policy effects and downstream consequences and whether they may be counter-productive to
community benefit expenditures or whether they even achieve their intended purposes.
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BACKGROUND
Physician Hospital Arrangements
Historically, hospitals served as a workshop for physicians, who were able to work
autonomously from hospital administration, where hospitals and physicians had separate
governing structures too, one board for medical staff and a separate board for hospital
administration (Burns et. al. 2010). This structure provided an autonomous platform for
physicians to practice separate from hospital control. Physician practice autonomy was
solidified early on in the healthcare industry, even with payment structures, with third party
payers paying hospitals and physicians separately (Burns et. al. 2010). However, physician
autonomy started eroding in the mid 1900s with legal rulings making hospitals liable for
physician behavior that hospitals contracted with for third party payers and also within the
hospitals; thus starting an initiative for hospitals demanding a certain level of quality from
physicians because of an emerging accountability by hospitals for quality outcomes (Burns
et. al. 2010). Later emerged payment structures such as the establishment of Medicare,
Medicaid, and later Medicare’s Prospective Payment System employing diagnosis-related
groups (DRG) (Burns et. al. 2010). The DRG payment structure was first to pay hospitals for
a diagnosis related event in total instead of a la carte payments for each hospital service and
activity separately (Burns et. al. 2010). Later managed care organizations provided capitated
payments for services to hospitals. These payment structures motivated hospitals to improve
cost containment and processes within the hospital, which in turn required physician
cooperation (Burns et. al. 2010). Current governmental policies and payment structures
continue to influence quality standards and cost containment.
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In response to quality and financial pressures, hospitals are motivated to enter into
physician-hospital arrangements, an alignment between hospitals and physician groups
through varying degrees of contracting, employment, and/or hospital privileges. Strategic
goals for integration from the nonprofit hospital perspective include capture of the outpatient
market, increasing revenue and margins, pricing leverage, and improvement of quality
outcomes (Burns and Muller 2008). Hospital motivation to form physician hospital
arrangements has changed; however, hospitals continue to have arrangements to integrate
with physicians. At the outset of physician integration, managed care organizations
encouraged hospital and physician integration through changing payment structures so that
hospitals and physicians shared risks with the managed care companies. In response
physicians and hospitals formed integrated organizations, such as physician hospital
organizations, which still exist today (Morrisey 1996). These organizations are separate
entities from hospitals and physician groups formed as a means for integration of hospitals
and physicians with physicians. Other reasons for continued hospital integration with
physicians includes providing a full continuum of care, increased competition from
freestanding care centers (e.g. imaging centers), and requirements to provide continuous
quality of care and efficiency (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010, Boone 2000).
In addition to strategic reasons, hospitals formed physician-hospital arrangements in
response to managed care and CMS payment strategies (e.g. pay-for-performance) (Burns
and Muller 2008, Christianson et. al. 2014, Cuellar and Gertler 2006). Payment policy
continues with the recent Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) initiated value
based purchasing to provide high-quality of care at lower costs from hospitals (CMS 2012,
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2017). The ACA along with other legislative initiatives introduced the Value Based
Purchasing program aimed at paying providers based on achieving certain quality outcomes.
This program shifts payments away from quantity of services provided to quality of care
(CMS 2018). These legislative initiatives started in 2008 with the Medicare Improvements
for Patients and Providers Act (CMS 2008). From 2008 to 2013, there were 599 instances of
hospitals initially having no physician integration (or physician-hospital arrangements) and
then later switched to having some degree of integration with physicians (Short et. al. 2017).
There was also 710 transitions to a fully integrated model by hospitals (Short et. al. 2013).
In addition to varying integration of physician hospital arrangements and a trend for
increase in physician hospital integration, there is also a current trend for physician
arrangements where hospitals employ physicians (high integration); an almost 75% increase
in employed physicians from 2000 to 2011 with continued plans to employ more physicians
(Kocher and Sahni 2011). Twenty three percent of physicians were employed by practices
partially or wholly owned by hospitals (Kane and Emmons 2013). This trend continues with
the latest Physician Practice Benchmark study showing that physician owned practice
arrangements dropped below 50% for the first time in 2016 meaning physicians are being
employed elsewhere or in different arrangements (Kane 2017).
Hospitals can choose to create a physician hospital organization through a variety of
different arrangements, which have varying degrees of integration, from little to full
integration (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). Dynan dichotomized physician hospital
organizations into two categories: those with high integration and those with low integration
(Dynan 1998). Dimensions of integration include levels of physician economic involvement,
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administrative involvement, group involvement and shared accountability with hospitals
(Dynan 1998). Hospital integration with physicians was also found to entail clinical
integration too (Dynan 1998). High integration is marked by “strong physician-hospital links,
coordinated systems of care, geographic reach, quality management, contractual capabilities,
utilization controls, financial strength, organized oversight and economies of scale” (Boone
2000). Essentially, highly integrated models are likely to coordinate with physicians to
impact physician behavior to achieve cooperation with process and quality outcomes. Models
that include high integration between hospitals and physicians are clinical and foundation
models (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). These models allow employment of physicians through a
wholly owned subsidiary of the hospital (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). These models also
allow physicians to have representation in the governance of such organizations, which may
include a physician as the CEO (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010).
Those physician-hospital relationships with little to no integration include the
independent medical staff and partnership model (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). In the
independent medical staff model, hospitals provide technology and support in order for
physicians to provide patient care and procedures at the hospital; the physicians are not
required to have their patients only come to a certain hospital but it is the hospital’s hope to
build loyalty (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). In this model, the physicians have little input in
hospital operations (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). In the partner model, a hospital may contract
with a physician group or physician to provide medical director services for a fee (Satiani
and Vaccaro 2010).
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Medium integration arrangements include physician-hospital organizations and
managed services organizations (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). A physician-hospital
organization is a conduit for hospitals and physicians to contract with managed care
organizations (e.g. an organization created solely for the purposes of hospitals and physicians
collectively contracting with insurance companies). Managed services organizations are
owned by hospitals to provide physicians with practice management services (administrative
services other than providing physician services, e.g. human resources) (Satiani and Vaccaro
2010). However, when looking at dimensions of integration management service
organizations are found to be as integrated as foundation models and integrated salary
models and are included in physician hospital organizations with high integration (Dynan
1998, Madison 2004). Closed and Open Physician hospital organizations were categorized as
low integration (Madison 2004).
Table 1 below shows the stratification of physician hospital organizations into high or
low integration categories used in Madison 2004, based on Dynan 1998. Table 4 in the
Methods section has definitions of each physician hospital organization.
Table 1. Physician Hospital Organizations level of integration (Adapted from Dynan
1998, Madison 2004)
High Integration Group Practice Without Walls, Management Service
Organization, Integrated Salary Model, Foundation Model,
Equity Model
Low Integration Independent Practice Association, Open Physician Hospital
Organization, Closed Physician Hospital Organization
Forming hospital physician arrangements may not have the intended effects on
hospital efficiency (Burns and Muller 2008). Cuellar and Gertler found no improvement in
efficiency with integration when looking at fully integrated hospitals compared to non-
6
integrated hospitals (Cuellar and Gertler 2006). Another study examined whether the trend of
physician integration into hospital governance and management increases hospital efficiency
(Succi and Alexander 1999). A hypothesis was that the influence of those physicians in
governance/management roles can better influence physician staff that is small, diverse and,
contains more employed physicians; however the study found that physician involvement led
to lower efficiency (Succi and Alexander 1999). Lower efficiency may be due to costs for
hospital monitoring of integrated physicians (need for administration), hospital coordination
costs between departments, and hospital cooperation cost (Cho 2015). From a societal
perspective, integrated delivery networks have higher costs (Goldsmith et. al. 2015).
Goldsmith et. al. also found that physician productivity drops and costs increase for hospital
employed physicians (Goldsmith et. al. 2015). However, Lelue et. al. found that fully
integrated models are more efficient, specifically for profit hospitals (Lelue et. al. 2018).
It was also found that if hospitals are categorized as higher efficiency (admissions and
visits per cost) then those hospitals provide more uncompensated care (Hsieh et. al. 2010).
With nonprofit hospitals entering into physician hospitals arrangements that are more
integrated there may be unintended impacts on hospital efficiency and perhaps also on
community benefit spending.
Importance of Nonprofit Hospitals
As seen above, the federal government created payment models encouraging
physician hospital organization formation, quality outcome pressures, and cost containment;
however, the federal government first established policy for nonprofit hospitals. About 51
percent of hospitals in the U.S. are non-governmental, nonprofit hospitals (NFPs) (American
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Hospital Association 2016). NFPs receive their nonprofit status from Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The code specifies that for nonprofit designation the organization
must operate for a listed exempt purpose and no benefits created by the organization are
given to shareholders. Those exempt purposes include religious, charitable, public safety,
literary, educational, etc. (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)).
A nonprofit designation is important to organizations because qualifying under
section 501(c)(3) exempts an organization from paying federal taxes on income and also may
exempt an organization from paying property and state taxes. This designation comes with
the condition that nonprofit hospitals provide community benefits. The obligation to provide
community benefits has evolved over the years from the requirement to provide charity care
to patients unable to afford care to a broader definition of community benefits (Rubin et. al.
2013). The change from the charity care requirement to the broader community benefit
requirement came in 1969 after the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid; easing the
burden of payment for hospital care, decreasing the need for charity care; and therefore
raising the importance of community benefits in exchange for tax exemptions (Rubin et. al.
2013). Hospitals were then and still are required to provide community benefits (Ginn and
Moseley 2006). The broader community benefit requirement includes discounted care
(charity care), but also includes “other hospital investments and activities promoting
community health” (Somerville 2012).
The broad community benefit requirements are clarified through the Internal Revenue
Service reporting requirements and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) defines community benefits as “activities or programs [that] also seek to
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achieve a community benefit objective, including improving access to health services,
enhancing public health, advancing increased general knowledge, and relief of a government
burden to improve health” (IRS 2017). In 2009, the IRS required a new reporting mechanism
of community benefits in the form of a tax return schedule (Rosenbaum 2016). This schedule
further clarified that bad debt (write-offs for non-payment of hospital services) is no longer
considered a part of charitable care (Rosenbaum 2016).
Nonprofit hospitals receive a large tax exemption; there was an estimated $24.6
billion tax exemption in 2014 (Rosenbaum et. al. 2015). If nonprofit hospitals receive a large
tax exemption then it would be expected that they provide sufficient community benefits;
however, there are conflicting reports on levels of provision of community benefits
(Rosenbaum et. al. 2015). According to the IRS, in 2011 private tax-exempt hospitals
reported over $62 billion dollars or 9% of total operating expenses were for community
benefits (Internal Revenue Service 2015, Rosenbaum et. al. 2015). By comparison, on a local
level, California investor owned hospitals provided slightly more uncompensated care at the
total level at $68,600 per hospital while nonprofit hospitals provided about $62,800 per
hospital (Schneider 2007). Generally, investor owned hospitals are not required to provide
community benefits. However, United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that
nonprofit hospitals on average when compared to for-profit hospitals provided more
community benefits, spending seven hundred million dollars more than for-profit hospitals
and three billion dollars total, when looking at a small sample of states (Texas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana) (CBO 2006).
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As seen, nonprofit hospitals may provide more community benefits than for profit
hospitals in some scenarios and not others; however, NFPs receive a large tax benefit and
have a requirement to provide these community benefits. Consequently, NFPs received
attention on their exemption status and the level of community benefits they provide. Public
scrutiny of nonprofit hospitals prompted the CBO in 2006 to produce its report on “Nonprofit
Hospitals and the Provision of Community Benefits” (CBO 2006). Later, a Congressional
Committee found that the “link between tax-exempt status and the provision of charitable
activities for the poor or underserved is weak” to the point where Congress considered
revising criteria for tax-exemptions for nonprofit hospitals (U.S. Senate 2007, p1). Senator
Grassley even proposed new legislation, which did not pass, to require a minimum standard
of nonprofit hospital charity care spending to be more in line with the nonprofit hospital tax
benefit (Carreyou and Martinez 2008). Public media also reported on the level of community
benefit spending noting NFP spending does not vary much from for-profit spending
(Rosenthal 2013, Cohen 2013, KHN 2010). The court system also enforced expectations of
community benefit provisions. The City of Pittsburg sued to challenge the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center’s tax-exempt status in 2013 because of its perceived commitment
to profits instead of charity (Rosenthal 2013). The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
had an operating revenue of almost $1 billion and reserves of more than $3 billion coupled
with only about 2% of its spending on charity care, which prompted questioning its behavior
as a nonprofit hospital (Rosenthal 2013). In addition to the City of Pittsburgh, The State of
New Jersey went further and removed a different NFP’s property tax exemption (Schencker
2015).
10
For its considerations for tax-exemptions and recent trends scrutinizing community
benefits from NFPs, the federal government will want to ensure that community benefits are
not being negatively affected by the formation of physician hospital organizations.
Conclusion
Nonprofit hospitals have varying relationships with physicians with differing degrees
of integration. Physician hospital integration and formation of physician hospital
organizations is in response to changes in provider reimbursement and CMS policies. The
shift in payment policies brought on by the Value Based Purchasing program from payer and
societal perspective drives for not only for lower costs but also higher quality; while also
wanting nonprofit hospitals to remain financially viable for sustainable health care from such
institutions. Nonprofit hospitals also have a self-interest to remain financially viable while
achieving better costs and qualities. At the same time, within this environment of physician
integration, NFPs are expected to produce community benefits as agents of the federal
government. However, what is not known is whether physician hospital integration
undergone to achieve quality and financial goals has an unintended effect on community
benefit spending. This study aimed to understand whether the types of physician-hospital
arrangements have an association with quality metrics, financial health, and also community
benefit expenses.
Principal Agency Theory Explaining Nonprofit Hospital Behavior
Principal agency theory informs this study. The principal is society represented by the
federal government. In principal agency theory (also agency theory), principals tasks agents
with certain duties and services through a contractual relationship, resulting in a principal-
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agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The principal delegates the agent with the
authority to make decisions on behalf of the principal; however, the interests of principals
and agents are not always aligned (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agents may be opportunistic
and attempt to maximize their own self-interests at the expense of the principal (agency
problem), including not performing principal assigned duties without controls in the agency
decision process (Fama and Jensen 1983). To align agents with principal goals, principals
will provide incentives (traditionally some economic incentive such as money) or monitor the
agent’s actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shapiro 2005).
In the context of an organization, there are residual claims, that is, excess cash flow.
Free cash flow is “discretionary cash flow available to managers in excess of that required to
fund all positive net-present-value projects” (Mann and Sicherman 1991, p214). Without
clear guidance regarding residuals, the agency problem arises. Principals are concerned about
the use of free cash flow because of the divergent interests between principals and agents. In
principal agency theory there is an assumption that agents will use residuals in their own self-
interests and not the principal’s interests. The divergent interests of free cash flow use is
more easily seen in a for-profit setting (however, the focus of this study is on non-profit
hospitals). In this setting, free-cash flow may be used by managers, who are agents for
shareholders, for their own self-interests or distributed to shareholders, the principals, as
dividends. One argument is that if shareholders and managers are aligned then efficiency
would be maximized in order to increase distributions to shareholders; however, managers
are self-interested and are motivated to invest free cash flow in investments that ensure their
employment (Mann and Sicherman 1991). One example of a self-interest is a manager
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investing in new projects that may not be the core business of the company in order to boost
the manager’s skill set (e.g. a service corporation acquiring a manufacturer in its supply
chain).
The federal government is also a purchaser who is trying to achieve better quality for
costs and at the same time the federal government is providing nonprofit hospitals with tax
exemptions in return for community benefits. To achieve these goals, the federal government
contracts with nonprofit hospitals, who can be viewed as the agent to the federal government.
Payment structures and policy has pushed physicians and hospitals toward vertical
integration. A part of this integration is for nonprofit hospitals to achieve higher quality and
financial health. It is also an interest of society to have sustainable quality healthcare;
however, it is not known whether pursuit of higher quality and financial health through
physician hospital organizational integration has unintended effects on community benefits.
Nonprofit hospital behavior is also explained using principal agency theory. NFPs are
expected to provide community benefits in order to receive and maintain their tax exempt
status. However, hospitals may not be providing as much community benefit as expected as
seen by media and governmental attention described above.
Again, the principal-agent model can explain nonprofit hospitals’ behavior regarding
their investment of free-cash flow. In this model, NFPs function as agents for the principals,
which are the community and government. The principals desire community benefits in
exchange for the tax exemptions, an economic incentive in order to align interests. The
nonprofit hospitals are agents that are responsible for investing any cash flow into
community benefits (the desire of the principal). In the nonprofit setting free cash flow may
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be subject to agency divergence under agency theory, meaning NFPs may make self-
interested decisions regarding free cash flow use, which may differ from desires of the
principal. Recent examples highlighted above with the University of Pittsburg Medical
Center and the State of New Jersey’s removal of one NFP’s property tax exemption, where
the interest of the medical center differed enough from principal intent of providing
community benefits enough for the government to remove the tax exemption. If NFPs are not
providing community benefits, they may be investing in other operating activities, new
projects, lines of business, and/or capital expenditures similar to for-profit corporations.
Agents (here NFPs) are self-interested and may have different interests than principals;
therefore, NFPs may not necessarily invest to the degree desired in community benefits at
levels expected by principals.
Nonprofit hospitals are also monitored differently by principals than for-profit
hospitals. Nonprofit companies are not subjected to shareholder oversight; however,
nonprofit hospitals are not without any oversight. In a nonprofit setting, debt financing
through the bond market may subject bond-funded acquisitions to some level of public
scrutiny when the nonprofit entity is reviewed for financing. Nonprofit hospitals also receive
oversight through their corporate boards. However, the hospital board is also an agent of the
government and does may not function as mechanism of public scrutiny to the extent of for-
profit corporations with shareholder oversight. Public scrutiny can be seen as principal
(governmental, public) monitoring for nonprofit hospitals. This may motivate management,
as agents, to use free-cash flow to finance some investments, which is not subject to public
scrutiny, as opposed to use debt financing for them where transactions are reviewed by
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outside stakeholders. The lack of oversight in the nonprofit setting (such as shareholders for
for-profit corporations) may also cause managers to invest in other investments instead of
community benefits (Kim et. al. 2009). With lack of direct oversight, principals
(government/community) may not directly monitor agent actions as well as stockholders in
the for-profit setting. Instead, principals, in this application of principal agency theory to
nonprofit hospitals, attempt to incentivize NFPs to invest in community benefits, which is the
desire of the principals, by offering a tax exemption.
Additionally, hospitals also have pressure to integrate with physicians. This pressure
comes from market competition with free-standing providers and also to provide a
“continuous, quality-conscious system” which would include physician services (Satiani and
Vaccaro 2010). Integration also stems from federal payment structures for improved quality
and the nonprofit hospital’s desire to achieve better federal reimbursement. Nonprofit
hospitals are interested in financial stability. Although not completely divergent from the
principal’s, the federal government’s, interest, hospitals are interested in quality of care and
financial health; however, the federal government is also interested in receiving community
benefits. Additionally, integrating physicians is an expensive prospect that requires
investment in physician “offices and electronic medical records” and capital purchases
(Satiani and Vaccaro 2010). With limited dollars available to fund new projects, NFP
management may invest in capital expenditures, a divergent interest from the principal’s
interest, instead of the desired to invest in community benefits. This may also be fueled by
influence from physicians through differing physician hospital arrangements; physicians are
a key stakeholder in the capital expenditure process and may pressure hospitals to invest in
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capital expenditures, as an example. This current study attempted to understand whether
physician hospital arrangements influence nonprofit hospital quality, financial health and
also unintended influence on spending on community benefits.
Public Health Significance
Payment structures and policy have pushed physicians and hospitals toward vertical
integration. Nonprofit hospitals are motivated to integrate physicians in order to achieve
higher quality and financial health. It is also an interest of society to have sustainable quality
healthcare; however, it is not known whether pursuit of higher quality and financial health
through physician hospital organizational integration has unintended effects on community
benefits. Tax-exemptions for nonprofit hospitals are in effect a subsidy for indigent care at
one point in time and now a subsidy for providing community benefits (Schneider 2007).
These community benefits are provided by the nonprofit hospitals instead of the federal
government itself (CBO 2006). This study contributes to understanding of influences of
policy encouraging physician hospital arrangements and quality for lower costs on hospital
community benefits expenditures.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Study Objective
The overall objective of this study is to understand whether physician hospital
arrangements are having the intended associations with quality measures and hospital
financial health and also to understand association with community benefit expenditures.
This overall objective is then broken down into three research questions.
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Figure 1 below shows how physician hospital organizations with high integration
may have an association on clinical quality, hospital financial health, and spending on
community benefits. Underlying any associations are hospital characteristics that may also
have associations with the same measures of quality, financial health, and community benefit
spending.
Figure 1. Physician Hospital Organizations Association with Quality, Finances, and Community Benefit
Spending
Research Questions
This study aims to determine: Is there an association with participating in physician hospital
organizations with higher integration and improved quality metrics, financial health and
increased community benefit spending per operating expenses?
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Research Question I. Quality Metric Improvement
Previous research on quality measures and associations with physician hospital
arrangements found mixed results on improvement. Madison found an association with
patients who had higher procedure rates for percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
and coronary artery bypass graft if they were patients of hospitals that formed a physician
hospital affiliation (Madison 2004). The same study also found lower mortality rates for
patients with acute myocardial infarction for patients of hospitals participating in physician
hospital affiliations; however, this association was not statistically significant (Madison
2004).
Scott et. al. looked at non-governmental acute care hospitals converting to an
employment relationship with physicians between 2003 to 2012 regarding certain quality
metrics: risk-adjusted hospital-level mortality rates, 30-day readmission rates, length of stay,
patient scores for common medical conditions (Scott 2017). The study found that there was
no association with hospitals switching to an employment based model with physicians and
improvement in quality metrics (Scott 2017). However, Cuellar and Gertler found fully
integrated organizations had improvements in the mortality measures (Cuellar and Gertler
2006). The same study also found that closed and open physician hospital organizations
reduced procedure overuse for certain types of patient (Cuellar and Gertler 2006). This study
also found that independent practice associations had no improvements in quality metrics and
an increase in mortality rates for certain patients (Cuellar and Gertler 2006). In this study, the
higher integrated physician hospital organizations (fully integrated model) had improvements
in quality metrics. In line with studies that do find improvements in quality metrics with
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hospitals that have physician hospital arrangements, the hypothesis for this research question
follows.
Hypothesis 1.
Physician hospital organizations with higher integration are associated with improved
quality metrics.
Research Question II. Financial Performance Improvement
There has been some research on financial health and different physician hospital
arrangements and physician integration strategies. Goes and Zhan looked at operational
profitability of California hospitals with differing integrations strategies post Medicare
prospective payment system (Goes and Zhan 1995). Types of integration were not formal
physician hospital organizations or arrangements but included hospital physician financial
integration, physician integration in governance, and physician ownership of hospitals (Goes
and Zhan 1995). Goes and Zhan found that financial integration of hospitals and physicians
had a significant interaction effect on financial performance (i.e. higher operating margin)
(Goes and Zhan 1995).
Burns et. al. looked at hospital integration with physicians (vertical integration) and
health plans (Burns et. al. 2005). The study found that hospitals that integrated with
physicians, through employment and practice acquisitions (forms of high integration),
invested $40 million to acquire physician practices and also experienced decreasing
operating margins (Burns et. al. 2005). This echoes a previous review by Burns and Pauly;
hospitals that pursued vertical integration through physician practice acquisitions
experienced poorer financial outcomes, suffering financial losses and not enough cash flow
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(Burns and Pauly 2002). Different from Burns et. al.’s research, within the context of
managed care organizations impact on hospital integration (forward and backward
integration), Wang et. al. found that hospitals that had backward integration with physicians
to provide outpatient services were associated with better operating margin ratios (Wang et.
al. 2001). There are inconsistent associations of integration with hospital financial outcomes
such as operating margin. Integration with physicians migrated from more informal
integrations like in Goes and Zhan’s study to more highly integrated forms seen in Burn et.
al.’s and Wang et. al.’s studies. However, Wang et. al. looked at the same financial outcome
as this study, operating margin. As such the hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2.
Physician hospital organizations with higher integration are associated with a higher
operating margin.
Research Question III. Increased Community Benefit Spending
There has been previous research on trends of community benefit spending by
hospitals over various time periods, all showing an increase in community benefit spending.
According to Leider et. al., pre-ACA spending on community benefits (2009 to 2012) was
8% of operating costs in 2009 and increased to between 8.3% to 8.5% in 2012 (Leider et. al.
2017). Over 80% of this community benefit spending was for charity care and the largest
hospital systems provided the majority of spending on community benefits (Leider et. al.
2017). Another general trend in community benefit spending close to these time points is the
increase in community benefit spending by tax exempt hospitals from an average of 7.6% of
operating expenses in 2010 to 8.1% of operating expenses in 2014. (Young et. al. 2018).
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Alberti et. al. expanded their research to include points pre- and post- ACA implementation
to understand ACA’s impact on community benefit spending looking only at teaching
hospitals (Alberti et. al. 2018). The study found that teaching hospitals increased spending on
community benefits post-ACA by $2.4 billion dollars, a 15% increase after adjusting for
inflation (Alberti et. al. 2018). However, even though an increase in overall community
benefit spending by teaching hospitals, there was a decrease of charity care spending between
2012 and 2015 by 16.17% (Alberti et. al. 2018). Shortell et. al. noted in their review of
hospital contribution to community health that hospitals that are a part of a system provide
more community benefits perhaps due to economies of scale available to a system (Shortell
et. al. 2015).
Current Trend in Community Benefit Spending
There appears to be a general trend of slightly more spending on community benefits
recently. During this same time there has also been a trend in physician hospital integration
as seen above; however, no studies were found regarding the impact of types of physician
hospital arrangements on community benefit expenditure. There is a link between increased
uncompensated care (a part of community benefits) and hospital efficiency; that is, the more
efficient a hospital is then the more such hospital provides uncompensated care (Hsieh et. al.
2010). There is mixed literature regarding physician hospital integration and its desired
improvement of hospital efficiency. One study found that more physician involvement in
hospital governance and management lead to lower hospital efficiency (Succi and Alexander
1999). Cuellar and Gertler found that higher integrated hospital physician arrangements were
shown to have little effect on hospital efficiency (Cuellar and Gertler 2006); however, Leleu
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et. al. found that higher integrated physician hospital organizations were more efficient
(Lelue et. al. 2018).
If hospitals were categorized as higher efficiency (admissions and visits per cost) then
there was more uncompensated care. Given that there appears to be an overall association of
lower efficiency with higher physician hospital integration and that hospitals categorized as
higher efficiency provide more uncompensated care then the hypothesis for this research
question is as follows:
Hypothesis 3.
Physician hospital organizations with higher integration are associated with lower
community benefit expenditures.
Figure 2 below illustrates Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 independent variables in relation to the
outcomes of interest: specified quality metrics, financial health and community benefits. The
figure also shows how the control variables for hospital characteristics may also be
associated with the dependent variable.
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Figure 2. Study Flow Diagram
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METHODS
This study was a cross-sectional study of nonprofit hospitals using secondary data
from the American Hospital Association (AHA), Guidestar, and Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Compare Datasets for the year 2015.
Population
Only nonprofit hospitals were included in the study sample. The study excluded
governmentally owned and for-profit hospitals because these entities do not have the
requirement to provide community benefits. Additionally, this study also excluded hospitals
that are excluded from the Value Based Purchasing program like cancer and children’s
hospitals (CMS 2012). Additionally, the population excluded hospitals that did not
participate in the AHA annual survey for 2015.
Effect Size Calculation based on Sample Size and Power
Table 2. Calculated effect size detectable
Dependent Variable Hospitals (n) Effect size
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Mortality Rate 1441 0.01
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Readmission Rate 1342 0.01
Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection 1750 0.01
Operating Margin 1757 0.01
Percent Community Benefits 930 0.21
A small effect size for a multiple regression is R2=0.02 (Ellis 2010). With statistical
significance (α) set at 0.05 and power (1-β) set at 0.80 and the sample size used for each 
dependent variable the effect size that can be detected was calculated using Stata 16. As seen
from the calculated possible effect size detected in Table 2 above, the sample size was
sufficient for each dependent variable to detect a small effect size.
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Data Sources
The main data sources included the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual
survey, specifically, information regarding hospital and physician information and the IRS
990s schedule H available at Guidestar (www.guidestar.org) for community benefits data
(please see the data table in the appendix specifying the source of the measure). CMS data
files were also used to collect case mix index, information on Medicare days, and wage
index. CMS Hospital Compare data files will be used to collect the dependent variables of
Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) 30 day mortality rate, Acute Myocardial Infarction 30
day readmissions, central line-associate blood infections (CLABSI).
The AHA collects data on 6,400 hospitals nationally with a historical response rate of
75% (AHA- Data Collection Methods). The AHA generates estimates for missing data from
previous years’ information and investigates changes in data from previous years for
validation and clarification (AHA- Data Collection Methods). The AHA reviews the data for
consistency and makes inquiries for data that does not fit historical trends or does not have
other reasons on the survey that explain the change.
Data regarding community benefits came from the IRS 990 Schedule H. These are
available through Guidestar, which has the IRS filings for nonprofit hospitals.
Data Collection and Storage
Data Collection
A dataset was purchased from the American Hospital Association. This dataset
contained information for hospital-physician arrangement, bed size, teaching status, rurality,
state, number of HMO contracts, number of PPO contracts and admission data used to
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calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Case mix index, percentage of Medicare days was
from the CMS IPPS 2015 file. Table 1A below in Appendix A contains further information
below regarding the source of data.
Dependent variable information came from AHA and CMS sources. The AHA
dataset contained a separate file for the operating margin dependent variable. The AHA
datasets (one with control information and the other with dependent operating margin) were
combined based on Medicare provider number. Dependent variables for Acute Myocardial
Infarction 30 day mortality rate, Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 day readmissions, and
Central line-associated blood infections came from CMS Hospital Compare datasets for
fiscal year 2015. The CMS Hospital Compare data was added to the dataset based on
Medicare provider number. Guidestar was used to collect information for community
benefits (total community benefits in dollars) for nonprofit, nongovernmental hospitals.
Percent community benefits was calculated by the total community benefits collected from
Guidestar divided by the total operating expenses provided in the AHA dataset.
Stata 16 was used to conduct analyses for all specific aims.
Data Storage
Information was kept secure on a password protected external hard drive.
Use of Data in Aims
Table 3 below includes the use of the independent and dependent variables, year, and
hospital characteristics used for the research questions.
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Table 3. Use of Measures in Research Questions
Research Questions
RQ 1. Association
of physician
arrangements and
quality measures
RQ 2. Association
of physician
arrangements and
financial health
RQ3. Association of
physician
arrangements and
community benefits
Dependent Variables
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30
day mortality rate X
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30
day readmissions X
Central line-associated blood
infections X
Operating Margin X
Community Benefits X
Independent Variables
High Integrated (Physician
Hospital Arrangements; Hospitals
may also have a physician hospital
organization with low integration
present also) X X X
Physician hospitals Organizations
with high integration only X X X
Physician hospitals Organizations
with low integration only X X X
Hospital and Market Characteristics (Controls for potential confounders)
Beds X X X
Teaching Affiliation X X X
System Affiliation X X X
Rural Referral Center X X X
Case Mix Index X X X
Managed Care X X X
Medicare Percent X X X
State/Region X X X
Wage Index X X X
27
Dependent Variables
The first research question assessed whether there is an association between hospital
physician arrangements with three quality metrics: Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 day
mortality rate (estimated deaths within 30 days of admission), Acute Myocardial Infarction
30 day readmission rate (estimated unplanned readmission measures from hospitalization for
acute myocardial infarction), and Central Line-Associated Blood Infections (observed cases
of central-line associated blood infections). The numerator for Acute Myocardial Infarction
(AMI) 30 day mortality rate is “death from any cause within 30 days from the date of
admission for patients discharged from the hospital with a principal diagnosis of AMI” (CMS
Measures Inventory Tool: RSMR). The denominator is “admissions for patients discharged
from the hospital with a principal discharge diagnosis of AMI and with a complete claims
history for the 12 months prior to admission” (CMS Measures Inventory Tool: RSMR) The
numerator for AMI 30 day readmission is the 30-day all-cause readmission, where a
readmission is “an inpatient admission for any cause, except for certain planned
readmissions, within 30 days from the date of discharge from the index AMI admission”
(CMS Measures Inventory Tool: AMI Readmission). The denominator for AMI 30 day
readmission is as for the AMI 30 day mortality rate (CMS Measures Inventory Tool: AMI
Readmission).
These quality metrics were chosen because of their use in previous studies looking at
hospital characteristics and quality metrics (Scott et. al. 2017, Silvera 2017). Scott et. al.
looked at hospital employment of physicians (a physician hospital organization model with
high integration) and associations with mortality rates and readmission rates finding that
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there was no improvement in quality metrics after switching to the employment model (Scott
et. al. 2017). Scott et. al. looked at composite mortality and readmission rates and individual
morality and readmission rates form acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and
pneumonia. The Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 day mortality and 30 day readmission rates
were chosen for this study in line with the Scott article but only looking at one subset of
quality measures. Silvera looked at CLABSI in association with hospital size (Silvera 2017).
Silvera hypothesized that increase in hospital size leads to looser coupling between hospital
administration and providers, specifically physicians (Silvera 2017). Hospital size was also
indicative of patterns of control and affiliation (Silvera 2017). If hospitals are larger there is a
threat to interdependence and perhaps not following recommended care guidelines (Silvera
2017). Silvera did conclude that larger hospital size was associated with diminished quality
(Silvera 2017). Additionally, CLABSI was a specific outcome measured by CMS as a part of
its fiscal year 2015 program (CMS HVBP Measures). Because of the finding that hospital
and physician coupling and the fact CLABSI was a specific outcome measure for 2015, this
study looked at CLABSI as another metric for quality.
The second research question assessed whether there is an association between
hospital physician arrangements with hospital financial health. Financial health was
measured by operating margin. Operating margin was calculated as net operating income
(revenue less expenses) divided by operating revenue.
The third research question assessed whether there is an association between hospital
physician arrangements with spending on community benefits. Community benefits was
divided by total expenses to get percent community benefits. This study used the total
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expenses in USD provided for community benefits listed in Schedule H. Total community
benefits includes: financial assistance at cost, Medicaid, costs of other means-tested
government programs, total financial and means-tested government programs, community
health improvement services and community benefit operations, health professions
education, subsidized health services, research, cash and in-kind contributions for community
benefit, and total other benefits (from IRS Schedule H of the Form 990). Community
benefits in the IRS 990 Schedule H form are self-reported by the organizations. IRS 990s
have been shown to be reliable for data entries from balance sheets and income statements;
however, other variables such as total contributions, program service revenue, program
service expense, and fundraising expense had lower consistency with audited financials
(Froelich 2000). One study found that California hospital self-reported community benefits
were a valid indicator of charitable activity (Rauscher 2012).
Key Independent Variables
The independent variable for the research questions were hospital physician
arrangements. Hospital physician arrangements were classified into high and low integration
per Madison 2004, based on Dynan, Bazzoli, and Burns 1998 categorizing on hospital
physician arrangements (seen in Table 4 below). Table 4 below has definitions of each
physician hospital arrangement as defined by the AHA, which reports whether hospitals
participate in the preceding arrangements in its annual survey. A variable, labeled High
Integration, was given the value 1 if a hospital had a highly integrated physician hospital
organization present and 0 if not present. The same was done for hospital physician
arrangements with low integration.
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Table 4. Physician Hospital Arrangement Independent Variables AHA Definitions
Physician
Hospital
Arrangement
AHA Definition
High Integration
Group practice
without walls
Hospital sponsors the formation of, or provides capital to physicians to
establish, a "quasi" group to share administrative expenses while
remaining independent practitioners.
Management
Service
Organization
A corporation, owned by the hospital or a physician/hospital joint
venture, that provides management services to one or more medical
group practices.
Integrated
Salary Model
Physicians are salaried by the hospital or another entity of a health
system to provide medical services for primary care and specialty care.
Equity Model Allows established practitioners to become shareholders in a
professional corporation in exchange for tangible and intangible assets
of their existing practices.
Foundation A corporation, organized either as a hospital affiliate or subsidiary,
which purchases both the tangible and intangible assets of one or more
medical group practices. Physicians remain in a separate corporate
entity but sign a professional services arrangement with the foundation.
Low Integration
Independent
Practice
Association
A legal entity that holds managed care contracts. The IPA then
contracts with physicians.
Open Physician-
Hospital
Organization
A joint venture between the hospital and all members of the medical
staff who wish to participate.
Closed
Physician-
Hospital
Organization
A PHO that restricts physician membership to those practitioners who
meet criteria for cost effectiveness and/or high quality.
(AHA Annual Survey 2015)
Hospital Characteristics (Controls for potential confounders)
Variables that have the potential to affect community benefits and physician
employment were controlled for including bed size, teaching status, and rurality. Studies use
bed size as an approximation of hospitals size and use for scale (Cochran & White 1981).
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Bed size also used in studies assessing community health and local public spending (Singh
2017). Teaching status and rural setting are also controls used in analysis (Singh 2017).
Schneider found that uncompensated care was higher for teaching hospitals, hospitals a part
of a multihospital system, disproportionate share hospitals, and large hospitals (Schneider
2007). Case mix index was also be included as a control. Case mix index is based on
discharge and based upon average diagnostic group related relative weight per hospital as
reported by CMS files and used in other literature (Singh et. al. 2018). Here, the CMS data
from the 2015 Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Final Rule and Correction
Notice was used for the source of CMS data. Managed care was shown to have an
association with integration and financial performance (Wang et. al. 2001). Managed care
was controlled for by measuring i. the number of HMO contracts (count that a hospital
reports) and ii. the number of PPO contracts (count that a hospital reports) as reported in the
AHA data (Wang et. al. 2001).
Some hospitals are also a part of a hospital system (an entity comprised of many
hospitals). A binary variable of whether a hospital was a part of a system was included to
capture whether or not a hospital is a part of system had an influence on the dependent
variables. Rurality, whether or not a hospital is designated as a rural hospital, was included as
a binary variable. Data came from the AHA data set for the system and rurality control
variables.
The percent of Medicare days was measured by finding the Medicare days reported
by CMS data files and total inpatient days to understand the proportion of payments that may
come from Medicare and also as a way of understanding payor mix for the hospitals (Borah
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et. al. 2012). CMS reported percent Medicare days as a part of its IPPS file. Percent Medicare
days was seen to be inversely proportional to the mean Value Based Purchasing Score, an
average of clinical process of care and patient satisfaction measures (Borah et. al. 2012). For
those that did not have a reported percent Medicare days, 0 was assigned.
Market competition for hospitals was measured by calculating the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index of the hospitals based on admitted patients (Singh et. al. 2018). To calculate
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), total admissions were used from the AHA data. HHI
was calculated at the county level. County information was provided in the demographic file
of the hospital compare dataset from CMS. The total admissions and county identification
were matched on Medicare provider numbers in from the AHA file to the CMS hospital
compare data file. Total market share available was calculated on total number of admissions
for the particular county with the total admission data provided by the AHA. Individual
hospital market share was calculated divided by hospital’s total admissions by the sum of
total admission for all hospitals in the same county. The market share was then multiplied by
100. Lastly, the market shares were then squared and summed for the county. For example, a
count with three hospitals with admissions a, b, c. The total is calculated T= a+b+c. The
market shares are then calculated for each hospital: Hospital A market share is a/T*100=A;
Hospital B market share is b/T*100=B, Hospital C market share is b/T*100=c. HHI is
calculated by HHI= A2 +B2 +C2. The HHI for all hospitals in the same will be the same e.g.
Hospital A, B and C will have the same HHI.
A variable for each state was created to take into account regulatory differences that
may impact independent and dependent variables. For instance, state regulation on
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community benefits requirements differ (Singh et. al. 2018) and corporate practice of
medicine doctrine may impact hospitals’ ability to employ physicians directly. Because state
is a categorical variable, interpretation was difficult with over 50 different state categories
(including Washington, DC and Puerto Rico). The AHA dataset did provide information
regarding US census regions. There were 10 census regions to group states into geographical
regions making interpretation easier. States that are in particular regions are listed in
Appendix D below.
Wage mix index was also a control. This hospital characteristic is reported by the
CMS data files and reflects the cost of labor in the market (Sloan 2011).
Datasets and Missing Data
A sample size of 6251 was provided by the AHA for the year 2015. Of these 6251
hospitals available in the AHA dataset, 3099 of the hospitals in the sample were categorized
as nongovernment, not-for-profit by the AHA. Of the 3099 hospitals, 2822 of these were
characterized as acute and critical hospitals; they were not characterized as long term acute
care hospital, children’s hospitals, or psychiatric/behavioral health hospitals. The Medicare
Hospital General Information website https://data.medicare.gov/widgets/xubh-q36u contains
information regarding characterization of the hospital type. Hospitals were looked up by
Medicare identification numbers. For those that were missing from the Medicare Hospital
General Information website referenced were imputed by Medicare number order. For
instance, a hospital may have a Medicare number not on the list but may be between two
hospitals on the list that are classified as an Acute Care hospital, therefore, the missing
hospital will be given the classification of Acute Care hospital also. For those that are not
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able to be classified in this manner were also included on the list but left as blank for its
characterization. Of the 2822 hospitals, 2727 hospitals participated in the Value Based
Purchasing Program (those that have data from the CMS Hospital Compare datasets). From
these 2727 hospitals, the individual datasets were created for each dependent variable.
For system membership, the AHA data provided the value 1 for hospitals that were a
part of a system; 0 was put in place for those hospitals that did not have the value 1 and were
blank. The number of hospitals that had a 1 for system membership was 1903 hospitals.
Hospitals that reported no information for HMO and PPO contracts were given the value 0. If
percent Medicare was not reported by CMS, 0 was imputed.
For missing information, list wise deletion was done as explained below for each data
set. It was not assumed that data was missing at random nor missing completely at random.
List-wise Deletion Steps
For list wise deletion for each dependent variable, the initial amount of hospitals in
the sample was the 2727 hospitals that participated in Value Based Purchasing Program.
Hospitals were removed from the sample if there was no information for the dependent
variable; that is the information reports was “Not Available” or was blank. Of the remaining
hospitals, those that had no information available for physician hospital organizations were
deleted. Hospitals were then deleted if they did not have information for the Case Mix Index,
Medicare Percentage, and Wage Mix Index. If the hospital did not have an HHI available, it
was also deleted. Table 5 contains the final hospital sample size used for each dependent
variable dataset.
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Table 5. Count of Hospitals in Datasets
Dependent Variable Hospitals (n)
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Mortality Rate 1441
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Readmission Rate 1342
Dependent Variable Hospitals (n)
Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection 1750
Operating Margin 1757
Percent Community Benefits 930
Data Analysis
As a first step, descriptive information regarding hospital physician organizations and
hospital characteristics were tabulated for each dependent variable. Each dependent variable
was also checked for normality before analysis (see Appendix B). Each research question
was analyzed in a similar manner with dependent variables differing for each research
question.
A multiple linear regression was to assess whether physician arrangements
(independent variables) have an association with quality outcomes (dependent variable-
Research Question 1), financial health (dependent variable- Research Question 2), and
community benefit expenditures (dependent variable- Research Question 3). This study
looked at hospitals that had a physician hospital organization with high integration first. The
same hospitals may have also had a physician hospital organization with low integration
present. To see if restricting physician hospital organizations with different levels of
integration would have an association with quality, financial performance, and community
benefits spending, this study also looked at hospitals with physician hospital organizations
with high integration only; that is, the hospitals did not have a physician hospital
organization with low integration present also. Lastly, the study looked at hospitals with low
36
integration physician hospitals, having no physician hospital organizations with high
integration present. Each model also included hospital characteristics that may impact
independent and dependent variables as described in Table 3 above.
For each dependent variable and each model a multiple regression was run with the
untransformed dependent variables. The residuals of this regression were checked for
normality and heteroscedasticity. A boxcox test was performed to check to see if the
dependent variable should be transformed. If the boxcox test indicated that the dependent
variable should be transformed, the dependent variable was transformed and the multiple
regression was ran again. Residuals after this regression were checked for normality and
heteroscedasticity again. If residuals were found to be non-normal and heteroscedastic, then a
robust multiple regression was performed. If residuals were found to be non-normal but
homoscedastic for each model, therefore a multiple regression with robust standard errors
was performed.
i. Log transformed dependent variables
Y1 = AMI 30 Day Mortality Rate, AMI 30 Day Readmission Rate, CLABSI
LnY1 = β0 + β1HighIntegration1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
LnY1 = β0 + β1HighIntegrationOnly1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
LnY1 = β0 + β1LowIntegrationOnly1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
ii. Non-transformed dependent variable
Y1 = Percent Community Benefits, Operating Margin
Y1 = β0 + β1HighIntegration1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
Y1 = β0 + β1HighIntegrationOnly1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
Y1 = β0 + β1LowIntegrationOnly1 + Hospital Characteristics*γi + εi
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For the CLABSI score dependent variable the equation above represents the second part of
the two part model. The first part of the model is a logistic regression when the dependent
variable for CLABSI is 0, 1; where 0 is a score of 0 and 1 represents a score greater than 0.
The equations for the logistic regression remain the same as ii. above but Y1 would not be
continuous as in the multiple regressions.
In the equations above, High Integration includes hospitals that have a physician
hospital organization with high integration present. The same hospitals may also have a
physician hospital organization with low integration present at the same time. High
Integration Only includes only hospitals with a physician hospital organization with high
integration present and no physician hospital organizations with low integration present. Low
Integration Only is the opposite of High Integration Only, where there are hospitals with
physician hospital organizations with low integration and no hospitals included if they have a
physician hospital organization with high integration.
Human Subjects, Animal Subjects, or Safety Considerations
The unit of measure for the specific aims is at the hospital level; therefore, there is no
concern for risk of loss of confidentiality of protected health information for individual
patients. However, for this study there is need to link the data to each organization. This
study also used data from the AHA, a third party, which must be purchased. With the data
owned by AHA and the link or data to individual hospitals, there is the concern that the
information remain confidential; however, this study was approved by the University of
Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institutional Review Board.
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RESULTS
Table 6 below contains the descriptive information for the sample population.
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Average Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Dependent Variable
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Mortality Rate (n=1441) 13.95 1.27 9.40 18.70
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Readmission Rate
(n=1342)
16.81
0.96 13.10
20.60
Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection (n=1750)
6.98 13.35 0 164
Operating Margin (n=1757)
-0.16 13.82 -157.03 104.58
Percent Community Benefits (n=930)
0.26 0.27 -5.63 2.69
Independent (number where present, Percent out of n=1757) Count Percent
High Integration 921 52%
High Only (no low integration present) 649 37%
Low Integration 485 28%
Low Only (no high integration present) 213 12%
Independent Practice Association (IPA) 180 10%
Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW) 33 2%
Open Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO) 279 16%
Closed Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) 70 4%
Management Services Organization (MSO) 108 6%
Integrated Salary Model (ISM) 763 43%
Equity Model 25 1%
Foundation Model 112 6%
Controls Count Average Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Beds 252 230 3.0 2654
Teaching Status* 818
System Affiliation 1323
Rurality** 105
Case Mix Index 1.55 0.27 0.67 2.89
Managed Care HMO Contracts 10.12 13.33 0 145
Managed Care PPO Contracts 19.96 101.54 0 4140
Medicare Percent 0.40 0.16 0.00 2.15
Market Competition (HHI) 5041.4 3377.9 28.8 10,000
Wage Index 1.00 0.19 0.40 1.72
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Table 6 shows averages and ranges for the dependent variables of interest. Over half
of the hospitals had a highly integrated physician hospital organization; 37% of hospitals had
a highly integrated physician hospital organization only present. While only 28% of hospitals
had a physician hospital organization with low integration present, there were even fewer at
12% having a physician hospital organization with low integration present only. The larger
amount of highly integrated physician hospital organizations may be reflective of the trend of
hospitals employing more physicians in response to federal payment policy. The table above
also has the breakdown of the amounts of the individual hospital physician organizations
found in the dataset, and also the averages and ranges of the control variables. For this
dataset not all states were present after the list wise deletion of hospitals with missing
information; no hospitals from Maryland were included in the dataset. All US census regions
were present in the dataset.
Table 7 below has the results of a regression run for each key independent variable
(Physicians hospital organizations present with High Integration, those with High integration
Only, and those with Low integration Only) as a dependent variable with the hospital control
variable as an independent variable to understand if there were any associations between the
Key Independent Variables (High Integration, High Only, Low Only) and the hospital
controls. The table below shows an association between physician hospital organizations
with high integration (including having physicians hospital organization with low integration
present) and whether the hospitals are located in Regions 5 (East South Central), 7 (West
South Central) and 8 (Mountain), case mix index, wage index, and beds. There is an
association between physician hospital organizations with high integration (no physician
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hospital organizations with low integration present) and Region 7 (West South Central), HHI,
case mix index, and Medicare percent. The table below also shows that there is an
association between physician hospital organizations with low integration (no physician
hospital organizations with high integration present) and Regions 2 (Mid Atlantic), 3 (South
Atlantic), 5 (East South Central), 8 (Mountain), and 9 (Pacific).
Table 7. Association between Key Independent Variables and Control Variables
[Coefficient (95% Confidence Interval)
Variable* High Integration High Only Low Only
Region 2 -0.08 (-0.6,0.4) -0.0013 (-0.48, 0.48) -1.21 (-1.89, -0.53)
Region 3 -0.16 (-0.63, 0.31) 0.37 (-0.1, 0.83) -1.39 (-2.08, -0.71)
Region 4 -0.44 (-0.89, 0.02) -0.32 (-0.79, 0.15) 0.04 (-0.52, 0.59)
Region 5 -0.87 (-1.45, -0.29) -0.48 (-1.09, 0.13) -1.77 (-2.88, -0.65)
Region 6 -0.03 (-0.55, 0.48) 0.3 (-0.22, 0.81) -0.39 (-1.05, 0.26)
Region 7 -0.53 (-1.03, -0.03) -0.57 (-1.1, -0.04) -0.37 (-1.01, 0.27)
Region 8 -0.64 (-1.2, -0.08) -0.15 (-0.76, 0.42) -1.31 (-2.22, -0.40)
Region 9 -0.2 (-0.7, 0.3) 0.08 (-0.42, 0.58) -1.09 (-1.8, -0.39)
Region 10 dropped dropped 1.75 (-0.1, 3.6)
HHI** -0.0002 (-0.003, 0.003) 0.006 (0.003, 0.009) -0.003 (-0.007, 0.002)
Case Mix Index 0.93 (0.57, 1.3) 0.38 (0.01, 0.74) -0.028 (-0.57, 0.51)
Medicare Percent 0.36 (-0.23, 0.95) 0.92 (0.31, 1.54) 0.12 (-.76, 1.0)
Wage Index 0.7 (0.2, 1.2) 0.1 (-0.4, 0.6) 0.08 (-0.68, 0.830
Teaching -0.26 (-0.45, -0.07) 0.03 (-0.16, 0.23) -0.21 (-0.5, 0.08)
Rural 0.04 (-0.36, 0.43) 0.3 (-0.1, 0.7) -0.29 (-0.95, 0.38)
HMO Contracts 0.006 (-0.001, 0.013) 0.0018 (-0.005, 0.009) 0.004 (-0.006, 0.014)
PPO Contracts -0.0006 (-0.002, 0.001) -0.001 (-0.005, 0.002) 0.001 (-0.0008, 0.003)
Beds 0.0016 (0.001, 0.002) 0.003 (-0.0002, 0.0007) -0.0002 (-0.0009, 0.0004)
System Member 0.07 (-0.15, 0.28) 0.15 (-0.07, 0.37) 0.2 (-0.1, 0.5)
*Region 1 is the comparison region for others. The base is set that teaching status is present. The base is set that
a hospital is not rural (therefore urban).
** HHI was divided by 100.
Teaching status was looked at in relation to the dependent variables in Table 8 below.
Hospital teaching status was found to be associated with better quality of care and mortality
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for AMI (Allison et. al. 2000). Krumholz et. al. also showed that teaching hospitals had a
lower risk standardized mortality rate for AMI but a higher risk standardized readmission
rate for AMI compared to non-teaching hospitals (Krumholz et. al. 2009). Table 8 below
shows that there is an association between teaching status and AMI 30 day mortality rate.
The table shows that compared to a teaching hospital, a non-teaching hospital is associated
with higher AMI 30 day mortality rates. Table 8 also shows an association between teaching
status and CLABSI, a non-teaching hospital is associated with a lower CLABSI score.
Table 8. Association between Teaching Status and Dependent Variables
AMI 30 Day
Mort
AMI 30 Day
Readmission CLABSI
Operating
Margin
Percent Community
Benefits
Teaching
Status*
0.0133
(0.0038, 0.0227)
-0.0044
(-0.0105, 0.0018)
-0.93
(-1.04, -0.81)
0.0002
(-1.3, 1.3)
-0.012
(-.037, 0.013)
*Base set that hospital is a teaching hospital.
Table 9 contains the coefficients, standard error and p value for each dependent
variable. Table 9 also contains dependent variable coefficients, standard error and p values.
Regression Results
Table 9. Multiple Regression Results for the Relationship between Physician Hospital Organization and Dependent
Variables for Quality, Financial Performance, and Community Benefits, Coefficient (95% Confidence Interval)
Hospital
Physician
Organization
AMI 30 Day
Mortality Rate
AMI 30 Day
Readmission
Rate**
CLABSI Operating
Margin**
Percent
Community
Benefits***
High Integration 0.00019
(-0.009, 0.10)
-0.000094
(-0.006, 0.006)
0.017
(-0.067, 0.101)
0.019
(-1.28, 1.32)
0.0021
(-0.021, 0.025)
High Only 0.0025
(-0.007, 0.012)
0.00013
(-0.006, 0.006)
0.018
(-0.069, 0.10)
-0.18
(-1.6, 1.2)
0.016
(-0.01, 0.04)
Low Only -0.014
(-0.028, 0.0001)
0.0019
(-0.007, 0.011)
-0.16
(-0.28, -0.028)
-0.32
(-2.04, 1.41)
0.014
(-0.014, 0.041)
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Dependent
Variables
AMI 30 Day
Mortality Rate
AMI 30 Day
Readmission
Rate**
CLABSI Operating
Margin**
Percent
Community
Benefits***
Region 2 0.0039
(-0.018, 0.026)
0.015
(0.0014, 0.029)
0.21
(-0.001, 0.42)
-0.053
(-2.85, 2.76)
0.021
(-0.025, 0.067)
Region 3 0.019
(-0.006, 0.044)
0.020
(0.004, 0.037)
0.27
(0.036, 0.5)
4.91
(1.78, 8.03)
-0.063
(-0.11, -0.016)
Region 4 0.0023
(-0.022, (0.026)
0.011
(-0.004, 0.026)
-0.024
(-0.24, 0.20)
5.55
(2.55, 8.53)
-0.029
(-0.072, 0.015)
Region 5 0.025
(-0.025, 0.017)
0.030
(0.008, 0.052)
0.26
(-0.049, 0.56)
0.94
(-3.11, 5.00)
0.041
(-0.035, (0.117)
Region 6 0.014
(-0.012, 0.041)
0.0039
(-0.012, 0.021)
-0.070
(-0.32, 0.18)
2.63
(-0.50, 5.77)
-0.046
(-0.093, (0.001)
Region 7 0.036
(0.008, 0.063)
0.012
(-0.005, 0.029)
0.3
(0.04, 0.5)
0.99
(-3.13, 5.11)
-0.06
(-0.11, -0.01)
Region 8 0.0043
(-0.025, 0.033)
-0.017
(-0.035, 0.001)
-0.16
(-0.43, 0.11)
0.37
(-4.13, 4,87)
0.030
(-0.024, 0.084)
Region 9 0.029
(0.005, 0.053)
-0.0076
(-0.024, 0.009)
-0.05
(-0.27, 0.17)
-0.5
(-3.9, 2.9)
0.073
(0.004, 0.14)
Region 10 -0.0082
(-0.11, 0.10)
0.049
(0.013, 0.086)
0.62
(-0.87, 2.1)
-2.27
(-10.03, 5.48)
0.68
(0.08, 1.3)
HHI* 0.00015
(0.00, 0.0003)
-0.00018
(-.0003, -.0001)
-0.0042
(-0.006, -0.003)
0.037
(0.011, 0.063)
-0.000016
(0,0)
Case Mix Index -0.031
(-0.058, -0.003)
-0.054
(-0.073, -0.036)
1.36
(1.13, 1.59)
8.19
(4.19, 12.19)
-0.12
(-0.19, -0.06)
Medicare
Percent
-0.034
(-0.07, 0.001)
0.0025
(-0.018, 0.023)
0.18
(-0.13, 0.49)
-7.21
(-13.56, -0.86)
-0.044
(-0.12, 0.03)
Wage Index -0.079
(-0.12, -0.04)
0.039
(0.013, 0.065)
0.057
(-0.3, 0.41)
1.6
(-4.1, 7.3)
0.0063
(-0.11.0.13)
Teaching -0.0058
(-0.016, 0.005)
-0.0022
(-0.009, 0.005)
-0.17
(-0.27, -0.07)
1.31
(-0.21, 2.83)
-0.013
(-0.043, 0.016)
Rural -0.0039
(-0.022, 0.015)
0.0022
(-0.013, 0.015)
0.11
(-0.06, 0.28)
-0.08
(-2.28, 2.12)
0.0083
(-0.027, 0.044)
HMO Contracts -0.00036
(-0.001, 0)
0.00011
(-0.0001, 0.0004)
0.0006
(-0.002, 0.004)
0.032
(-0.012, 0.076)
-0.00016
(-0.001, 0.0007)
PPO Contracts 0.000025
(0, 0.00007)
-5.41 x 10-6
(-0.00001, 0)
0.00023
(-0.0001,
0.0006)
0.0016
(-0.0013,
0.0045)
0.00033
(-0.0002,
0.0009)
Beds -0.00003
(-0.00006, 0)
0.000033
(0.00002,
0.00005)
0.0024
(0.0022,
0.0026)
-0.0032
(-0.007,
0.0001)
0.00011
(0.0001,
0.00016)
System Member 0.0042
(-0.007, 0.016)
-0.000057
(-0.007, 0.008)
0.036
(-0.068, 0.14)
-4.15
(-5.77, -2.52)
0.018
(-0.008, 0.044)
Constant 2.77
(2.7, 2,8)
2.86
(2.8, 2.9)
-1.4
(-2.0, -0.8)
-14.92
(-23.84, -6.00)
0.44
(0.26, 0.63)
Region 1 is the comparison region for others. The base is set that teaching status is present. The base is set that a
hospital is not rural (therefore urban).
* HHI was divided by 100.
** Robust regression ran.
*** Not natural log transformed and robust regression.
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Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Mortality Rate
The hypothesis for physician hospital organizations that are highly integrated would
be associated with lower AMI 30 day mortality rates. This was not the case, there is not an
association with hospitals that have a physician hospital organization that is highly integrated
(whether or not a physician hospital organization with low integration is present) and AMI 30
day mortality rate.
Even though there was no association found for hospitals having physician hospital
organizations that have high integration, there were certain hospital characteristics for those
hospitals that did have an association with AMI 30 day mortality rate. A hospital in Regions
7 (West South Central), 9 (Pacific) and 10 (Associated Areas, e.g. Puerto Rico) (see
Appendix C with detailed information regarding Regions), case mix index, wage index,
number of HMO contracts, and total number of beds did have a significant association with
AMI 30 day mortality rate. Of these hospital characteristics, wage index had the greatest
absolute association with AMI 30 day mortality rate; holding all other variables constant, for
every one unit increase in wage index, there is a 7.9% decrease in AMI 30 day mortality rate.
Acute Myocardial Infarction 30 Day Readmission Rate
The hypothesis for physician hospital organizations that are highly integrated would
also be associated with lower AMI 30 day readmission rates. This was not the case, there is
not an association between highly integrated physician hospital organizations (whether or not
a physician hospital organization with low integration is present) and AMI 30 day
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readmission rate. There is also no association with hospitals that only have physician hospital
organizations with low integration.
Again, there were certain hospital characteristics for those hospitals that did have an
association with AMI 30 day readmission rate. A hospital in Regions 2 (Mid Atlantic), 3
(South Atlantic), 5 (East South Central), and 9 (Pacific) and 10 (Associated Areas), HHI,
case mix index, Medicare percentage, wage index, and total number of beds (very small
association with beds) did have a significant association with AMI 30 day readmission rate.
The largest association of the hospital characteristics was being located in Region 10
(Associated Areas) (keeping all other variables constant, there if a hospital is located in
Region 10 (Associated Areas) compared to Region 1 (New England) there is a 4.9% increase
in AMI 30 day readmission rate.
Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection
Like the other quality measures AMI 30 day mortality rate and AMI 30 day
readmission rate, the original hypothesis for the CLABSI score was that hospitals that had a
physician hospital organization with higher integration would be associated with lower
CLABSI scores. Hospitals that had a physician hospital organization with high integration,
whether or not there was a physician hospital organization with low integration present, there
was no association with CLABSI rates either higher or lower. However, if a hospital only
had a physician hospital organization characterized as low integration there was an
association with lower CLABSI rates. For hospitals that only have a physician hospital
organization with low integration, holding all other variables constant, if a low integration
physician hospital is present then there is a 16 percent decrease in the CLABSI score.
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Other hospital characteristic control variables are associated with the CLABSI score.
If a hospital is located in Regions 3 (South Atlantic) and 7 (West South Central), the case
mix index, HHI, whether the hospital is a teaching hospital, and the total number of beds also
had a significant association with the CLABSI score. Of these hospital characteristics, case
mix index had the greatest absolute association with CLABSI score; holding all other
variables constant, for every one unit increase in case mix index, there is a 1.36 increase in
CLABSI score.
The analysis of CLABSI dependent variable was done with a two part model (See
Appendix B below), where a logistic regression was first run because of the large amount of
true 0s found in the sample. A regression is then run on the positive values for sample while
also taking into account the effects of the entire sample including those with a 0 value for the
dependent variable. Table 9 above contains the results from the regression. Table 10 below
contains the results from the logistic regression. The logistic regression shows that there is a
significant association between the presence of a physician hospital organization with high
integration and CLABSI score; holding all other variables constant, if a physician hospital
organization with high integration is present then there is a 0.12 decrease in CLABSI score;
however, the CLABSI score range was from 6.98 to 164 with an average CLABSI score of
13.35.
Table 10. Logistic Regression Results for CLABSI
Variable Coefficient
Std.
Error
p
value
High Integration -0.12 0.14 0.4
High Only 0.03 0.15 0.8
Low Only 0.02 0.21 0.9
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Operating Margin
For the dependent variable operating margin, the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) was that
hospital with physician hospital organizations that were highly integrated would be
associated with higher operating margins. The results in Table 7 show that there is no
association between highly integrated physician hospital organizations and operating margin.
Additionally, there is no association between operating margin and physician hospital
organizations with low integration.
Hospital characteristics, controls, that are associated with operating margin are
whether the hospitals are located in Regions 3 (South Atlantic) or 4 (East North Central),
HHI, case mix index, Medicare percentage, number of HMO contracts, number of PPO
contracts, and whether the hospital is not a part of a system of hospitals. Case mix index
again was seen having the largest absolute association with operating margin (holding all
other variables constant there is a 8.19 unit increase in operating margin for every 1 unit
increase in case mix index).
Percent Community Benefits
Hypothesis 3 suggested that there would be an association between hospitals with
physician hospital organizations that are highly integrated and lower percent community
benefits (community benefit expenditures over total expenditures). The results showed that
there is no association between hospitals with physician hospitals organizations characterized
as highly integrated and lower percent community benefits. Additionally, there was also no
association between hospitals with physician hospitals organizations with only low
integration and percent community benefit expenditures.
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Again, there are hospital characteristics that are associated with percent community
benefit expenditures. A hospital in Regions 3 (South Atlantic), 9 (Pacific), and 10
(Associated Areas), HHI, wage index, case mix index, and total number of beds did have a
significant association with percent community benefit expenditures. The largest association
of the hospital characteristics was being located in Region 10 (keeping all other variables
constant, there if a hospital is located in Region 10 (Associated Areas) compared to Region 1
(New England) there is a 0.68 increase in percent community benefits).
Noticeably, case mix index was significantly associated with all dependent variables.
Case mix index had a negative association for AMI 30 day mortality rate and AMI 30 day
readmission rate, a desired outcome; however, there was a positive association with the
CLABSI score (holding all other variables constant, for every unit change in case mix index,
there is a 1.36 unit change in CLABSI score). Case mix index is most likely associated with
the quality metrics because the metrics are risk adjusted (CMS “About the Data”). There was
a positive association with operating margin, a desired outcome (holding all other variables
constant, there is a 8.19 unit increase in operating margin for every 1 unit increase in case
mix index). Suggesting that a higher case mix index contributes to better financial
performance. Lastly, case mix index was negatively associated with community benefit
percent (holding all other variables constant, there is a -0.12 unit change in community
benefit percent for every 1 unit increase in case mix index).
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DISCUSSION
At the outset the objective of this study was to understand whether physician hospital
arrangements were associated with certain quality measures, hospital financial health, and
community benefit expenditures.
Quality Metrics
This study aim was to explore whether there was an association between physician
hospital organizations and quality metrics. The hypothesis was that physician hospitals
organizations with higher integration would be associated with lower quality metrics based
on previous limited literature looking at physician hospital associations and quality metric
associations. Unlike previous literature, which had mixed findings regarding the association
with physician hospital organization and quality metrics (Scott, 2017, Madison 2004, Cuellar
and Gertler 2006), this current study found that there was no significant association between
quality metrics and higher integrated physician hospital organizations. Contrary to the
hypothesis predicting lower quality metrics in the presence of higher integrated physician
hospital associations, there was a non-significant association between higher integrated
physician hospital associations and higher rates AMI 30 day mortality rate and higher
CLABSI scores. These hospitals may have also had a physician hospital organization with
low integration but the hospitals had a least one physician hospital organization with high
integration present. There was an association of lower AMI 30 day readmission rates with
high integration physician hospital organizations hypothesized; however, this again was not
significant.
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Looking at hospitals that had only a high integration physician hospital organization
(no low integration physician hospital organization present), there was no significant
association present with the quality metrics; however, the data showed that if only higher
integration physician hospital organizations were present then there was an association with
higher AMI 30 day mortality rates, AMI 30 day readmission rates, and CLABSI scores.
These were not expected results. The expectation was with higher integration and control of
physician behavior, then there would be better quality metrics.
Also contrary to the hypothesis, there was a significant association with physician
hospital associations with low integration (no high integration physician hospital
organizations present) and lower AMI 30 day mortality rate and CLABSI scores. Low
integration physician hospital organizations were associated with higher AMI 30 day
readmission rates but not significantly. Although not necessarily looking at the degree of
integration of physician hospital organizations, previous studies have seen mixed results for
quality of care measures after hospital physician vertical integration (Post et. al. 2018).
Similarly, previous studies showed marginal and insignificant improvement for mortality
rates (Post et. al. 2018). Another recent study showed that physician practices and physician
hospital organizations participating in a private payer pay-for-performance model in the State
of Michigan had more positive quality indicators for primary care measures than those that
did not participate (Lemark et. al. 2015). Physician hospital organizations in this study
included independent practice associations, physician hospital organizations, and large
multispecialty group practices (no clarification on whether the group practices were clearly
an organization with a hospital) (Lemark et. al. 2015).
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Hospitals employ varied strategies to achieve quality metrics (Bradley et. al 2012,
Bradley, Curry, Horwitz et. al. 2012, DePalo et. al. 2010, Heidenreich et. al. 2009, Kripalani
2014, Marschall et. al. 2008, Peterson et. al. 2006). These practices to achieve quality
outcomes are multi-faceted and complex; that is, there are aspects that are controlled at the
hospital level (technology, staffing, nursing practices) and some are controlled by physicians.
Hospitals have control over staffing levels, large capital and technology expenses, and staff
process of care; however, hospitals may not have complete control over physician behavior.
These processes do require physician involvement. Direct care providers, like physicians, are
responsible to adhering to infection control practices (Marschall 2008) and complying with
recommended guidelines. If hospitals are setting out to control physician behavior through
higher integration to achieve better quality metrics, this study shows that this is not
necessarily the case. When physician hospital organizations with higher integration are
present in this study, there are worse performing quality metrics. (The exception being very a
slight decrease in AMI 30 day readmission rates). Instead, the study showed that physician
hospital organizations with low integration provided better quality metrics. Physicians had
have a history of being autonomous and separate from hospitals (Burns et al 2010).
Participating with low integration physician hospital organizations with more limited
constraints on physician autonomy may be enough to produce better quality metrics similar
to the Michigan experiment.
Management may want to consider its motivations for forming physician hospital
organizations thoroughly before entering such organizations, and, in particular, what type of
physician hospital organization to form. If a goal is to have physician behavior controlled
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through high integration to achieve quality metrics, this study suggests that forming a
physician hospital organization with high integration may not be the best platform.
Management may want to investigation physician hospital organizations with low integration
as a means first to accommodate physician autonomy but still have a degree of integration.
An added benefit of a physician hospital organization with lower integration would be the
added benefit of lower costs to hospitals; that is, the hospitals may not need to incur costs for
physician salaries in an employment model. Management will also need to balance
performing certain quality metrics with also providing necessary services (e.g. cardiology
coverage) if not possible via physician hospital organizations with lower integration, were
the only means of such guaranteed coverage is an employment model.
Operating Margin
Hypothesis 2 suggested that there would be an association between higher operating
margins and hospitals that had a physician hospital organization with high integration. Goes
and Zhan previously showed that more financial integration between hospitals and physicians
was associated with higher operating margins; therefore, the higher integration between
hospitals and physicians through physician hospital associations with higher integration, the
higher the operating margins (Goes and Zhan 1995). However, other studies showed that
more integration with physicians were associated with lower operating margins (Burns et. al.
2005, Burns and Pauly 2002).
This current study found inconsistent results regarding an association between
hospital operating margin and physician hospital integration. This current study found that
highly integrated physician hospital organizations have a positive association with operating
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margin; however, if a physician hospital organization with high integration is only present
(none present with low integration) then there was a negative association with operating
margin. If a physician hospital organization with low integration is only present then there is
also a negative association with operating margin. However, none of the associations were
significant.
Hospitals and physicians may have a variety of reasons for forming physician hospital
organizations. Such reasons may include a relationship with physicians in order to capture
more reimbursements and pressure from declining reimbursements, a means to control
quality of physician services at the hospital, and perhaps a means of guaranteeing certain
services may be offered at the hospitals (Page et. al. 2013). For instance, a hospital may
employ a neurosurgeon to ensure that certain neurosurgeries may take place at the hospital.
Gapenski found that if a hospital offered more services, there was positive association with
profitability (Gapenski et. al. 1993). Another study found that certain services available at
hospitals contribute toward contribution margin, one study found, if appropriately staffed,
acute care surgery, which includes trauma, surgical critical care, and emergent general
surgery have a positive contribution margin. There has been a trend of hospitals employing
more hospitalists and specialists; perhaps expanding services and explaining why there is a
positive association between the presence of a physician hospital organization with high
integration and operating margin.
This current study produced inconsistent results when only a physician hospital
organization with high integration is present and only one with low integration is present.
This suggests that there may be more explanations associated with operating margin
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significantly that may impact operating margin. Gapenski et. al. performed a study to identify
determinants of hospital profitability. (Gapenski et. al. 1993). The study discovered teaching
status, use of debt financing, labor intensity (full time equivalent per inpatient day), Medicare
and Medicaid percentages, had a negative association with profitability that profitability was
measured by pre-tax and after-tax operating margins (Gapenski et. al. 1993). Kim also found
that a decrease in occupancy, increase in Medicare and Medicaid percentages, increased
market competition (HHI), teaching status, led to financial distress of hospitals (Kim 2010).
Interestingly, Kim found that an increase in physician supply led to increased hospital
financial distress (Kim 2010). Younis et. al. found that being a teaching hospital, being in the
South region of the U.S. compared to the Northeast region, occupancy rate above 50%, and
bed size below 100 were associated positively with profitability measured by return on assets
(net income divided by total assets) (Younis et. al. 2006).
Hospital management may be forming physician hospital organizations in response
payment programs from the federal government. That is, hospitals are creating the
organizations in order to capture more federal reimbursements encouraging shared quality
outcomes for patients with the thought of providing better quality metrics; however, it is not
clear whether there is an association with the creation of physician hospital organizations and
operating margin. The cross section design of the study does not provide temporality in order
to understand whether low operating margins cause hospitals to form a physician hospital
organization or a result of forming the organizations instead. Hospital managers will, as they
must certainly do, trend its operating margin and other financial indicators as they respond to
federal payment structures.
54
As seen above when discussing quality metrics and possible associations with
physician hospital organizations with high integration, these organizations may not have
intended quality outcomes. The presence of a physician hospital organization with high
integration does not necessarily mean that there are better AMI 30 day mortality rates and
CLABSI scores and only are associated with marginal, insignificant improvement in AMI 30
day readmission rates. However, this study shows that physician hospital organizations with
higher integration are associated more positively with operating margin. Hospital managers
will need to balance forming physician hospital organizations to produce better quality
metrics and the actual effect of those physician hospital organizations on operating margin.
Community Benefits
The hypothesis at the start of the study was that community benefit expenditures (as a
percent of total expenditures) would be associated with hospitals that have a physician
hospital organization with high integration. No study was available in the literature speaking
to the impact or association of physician hospital organizations on hospital community
benefit spending; however, there was literature finding hospitals with higher efficiency
having higher uncompensated care, while hospitals that had higher physician hospital
integration led to lower efficiency. This led to the thought that hospitals with physician
hospital organizations with higher integration would have lower efficiency and; therefore,
lower spending on community benefits.
This study found that contrary to the hypothesis, there was a positive association
between community benefit spending and hospital physician organizations. The largest
association was present when a hospital only had a hospital physician organization with high
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integration (no hospital physician organizations with low integration present). However,
again, none of the associations between percent community benefit expenditures and
physician hospital organizations were significant.
As stated, overall, there has been a slight increase in spending in community benefits.
The ACA did not mandate specific amounts but steered hospitals to contribute to specific
community needs through conducting and creating programs based upon community needs
assessments. However, charity care remained static for some of the largest healthcare
systems (Bannow 2018). After a decline of spending on charity care, charity care spending
was at the same level in 2016 as it was the year before in 2015 (Bannow 2018). Chaiyachati
et. al. found that for the years 2012 through 2014 there was no change in community benefit
spending on health care related activities (Chaiyachti 2018). The same study also found that
after adjustment, community benefits were not related to community characteristics and
remain a small amount of overall hospital expenditures (Chaiyachti 2018). Although there
was a limited response to ACA pushes in community benefit targeted spending, hospitals
have responded to policy focused on reimbursement programs. Hospitals have responded to
policies by forming physician hospital organizations and participating in the Value-Based
Purchasing Program. This study alludes that the formation of physician hospital associations
in response to some policy is at least not in conflict and in line with other governmental
policies to steer community benefit spending.
Although the presence of physician hospital organization with high integration in this
sample did not show a significant association with an increase in community benefit
spending. There are also possible other explanations and associations related to community
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benefit spending not accounted for in this study. Bai found that in California nonprofit
hospitals, a larger board size was associated with greater social performance (captures as
community benefits) (Bai 2013). The same study also found that having a physician board
members also resulted in a positive association with social performance although not
significantly (Bai 2013). Internal and external financial factors also influence community
benefit spending. Kim et. al. found free cash flow and long-term debt to capital were
negatively associated with charity care spending by California hospitals (Kim et. al. 2009).
(Kim et. al. 2009). Chang et. al. found that after state budget cuts to reduce health-related
expenses in Texas, there was an increase in the ratio of uncompensated care expenses to
gross patient revenue and charity care to total revenue (Chang et. al. 2012). Kim et. al. found
that there was a positive association with uncompensated care expenditures in the market
with charity care spending by the individual hospital (Kim et. al. 2009). Kim found that
nonprofit mission coupled with financial ability (free cash flow) positively associated with
charity care expenditures (Kim et. al. 2009).
In other instances, hospitals did respond to changes in policy regarding community
benefits. Hospitals in Texas responded to changes in community benefit law requiring a
minimum amount 4% of net revenue for community benefit spending (Kennedy et. al. 2010).
Hospitals spent more to meet the minimum if they were not previously and those that were
above the threshold had a minimal dip in spending (Kennedy et. al. 2010). Federal policy
may need to have more direct requirements for community benefits spending instead of the
current requirements for a community needs assessment without a mandated contribution
minimum. With no stated federal requirement, managers may not be as keyed into providing
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a certain level of community benefits unless statutorily required. Hospital managers may not
even consider an assessment of community benefit impact when forming physician hospital
organizations; perhaps, at most how physician hospital organizations may meet any needs
through the community needs assessment. Hospital managers may be more interested in
achieving financial and quality goals instead certain community benefits. However, managers
should at the same time consider whether the formation physician hospital organizations will
negatively impact the hospital’s ability to provide community benefits. This study showed
that the presence of physician hospital organizations with high integration are at least not
having an negative association with community benefits, even if the positive association is
marginal and not significant.
As discussed, managers will need to understand the potential impacts of physician
hospital organizations with high integration on quality, financial health, and community
benefits. The federal government, as a principal, is also interested in the same outcomes for
hospitals. The federal government provides tax breaks to hospitals, but is interested in some
return for these tax breaks. The federal government structures payment to achieve certain
quality goals. As a consequence, hospitals are forming physician hospital organization to
achieve certain quality metrics and a trend toward employing more physicians, meaning
forming physician hospital organization with higher integration. With this push toward
physician hospital organization with higher integration formation, this current study
suggestions that there may not be intended association desired by the federal government in
that the presence of physician hospital organizations with high integration is associated with
higher AMI 30 day mortality rates and CLABSI scores, and slight improvement with AMI 30
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day readmission rates. The federal government as a principal is interested in ensuring that
hospitals remain financially solvent. If hospitals are not financially solvent then hospitals will
not remain open and providing services to Medicare and Medicaid patients, another desire of
the federal government as a purchaser of services. This study suggests that even with policy
pushing hospitals to form physician organizations, operating margin and community benefits
are not negatively affected; however, quality metrics may not be as desirable as intended.
Community benefits also may not be as greatly positively impacted as desired by policy
without an explicit level of community benefit contribution; however, this study does show at
least there is no negative association with the presence of physician hospital organizations
with high integration.
This study suggests that policies pushing hospitals toward formation of physician
hospital organizations with high integration may not be associated with the desired quality
metrics but do have a positive association with community benefit spending; which is a
desired benefit for public health. However, this association is small and not significant. As
far as public health implications go, there may be other programs that can possibly better
achieve better public health. This study also does not have clear indications for public health.
An objective of public health is, of course, to have a healthier population. The federal
government does want to encourage certain quality metrics for hospital to benefit Medicare
and Medicaid patients (and all patients more broadly), but the government also provides a
large tax break for community benefits. Alternatively to providing this tax break, the federal
government through taxes on revenue and to some extent local governments through taxes on
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property and sales, could receive the tax income and apply them to programs that directly
provide health services to improve public health.
Audience and limitations
Audience
One audience for this dissertation is hospital management, so they may understand
empirically how hospital physician organizations are impacting quality and financial
measures. Another important audience is policy makers. Policy makers may understand more
the downstream implications of hospital payment programs impact on quality and financial
metrics and also desired community benefits.
Limitations
This study is a cross-sectional design. As such, a limitation to this design is
ambiguous temporal precedence, whether the dependent variables came first or the
independent variables (Shadish 2002). This study does not attempt to understand causality,
but instead any existing associations between dependent variables and physician hospital
associations. Another limitation is the ability to generalize this study to all types of hospitals.
This study specifically looks only at nonprofit hospitals because of the governmental
requirement to provide community benefits. Other hospitals do provide community benefits,
sometimes in the same or more amounts of nonprofit hospitals. This study also only included
hospitals participating in the Value-Based-Purchasing Program. The study sample was
further limited to hospitals that had data available for this program; that is, the response was
not available for quality metrics of interest. This specific sample set limits generalization to
all hospitals. Generalization was further limited by list wise for missing variables. This
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reduced the sample size for hospitals that had available information, perhaps including
hospitals reporting all variables having certain characteristics. In particular, the state of
Maryland had not hospitals included in the datasets because of list wise deletion.
There is the possibility also that confounders not included can be influencing
dependent variables. To minimize as many confounders as possible, the study collects
information on hospital and market characteristics that may possibly influence the dependent
and independent variables so that the confounders can be controlled for statistically.
Lastly, the AHA survey is voluntary. This study does not look into whether there is
bias due to certain hospitals that self-select to provide AHA information.
CONCLUSION
Federal policy has been to provide tax breaks to non-profit hospitals with the
requirement for nonprofit hospitals to provide community benefits. At the same time, the
federal government is also a payer for hospital services. As such there are policies layered on
top of the initial tax policy and requirement of community benefits to achieve high quality
for low costs. These payment policies motivate hospitals to form physician hospital
organizations to capture better reimbursements, contemporaneously with a trend of hospitals
employing physicians.
It is important for the federal government to understand whether its payment policies
can achieve what they set out to without unintended consequences. This study set out to
understand if there was an association between physician hospital organizations with high
integration forming in response to payment policies and quality, operating margin, and
community benefit expenditures. This study showed that there is an association with higher
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AMI 30 day mortality rates and CLABSI scores with physician hospital organizations with
high integration; an undesirable outcome. This study also showed that there is an association
with these physician hospital organizations and lower AMI 30 day readmission rates, higher
operating margin, and higher spending on community benefits. None of these associations
were significant.
No clear direction is apparent for the federal government regarding payor policies
causing unintended consequences regarding hospital community benefits spending; however,
the formation of physician hospital organizations with high integration may not have the
quality metrics desired. The federal government will have to consider its policy effects and
downstream consequences and whether they may be counter-productive to community
benefit expenditures or whether they even achieve their intended purposes. The federal
government may also want to have more direct policies regarding community benefit
spending with explicit amounts mandated to ensure that community benefits spending is
adequate enough for the tax breaks nonprofit hospitals receive.
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APPENDIX A
DATA CHART AND SOURCE
Table 1A below contains the data sources and data points that will be used for the study and
for which research questions. As mentioned above, the data came from Guidestar, AHA and
CMS.
Table 1A. Data Chart
Variable Question Definition Data Source Literature
Dependent
Acute Myocardial
Infarction 30 day
mortality rate
Research
Question 1
Estimated deaths
within 30 days of
admission
CMS Hospital
Compare data
Figuero et. al. 2016
Acute Myocardial
Infarction 30 day
readmission
Research
Question 1
Estimate of unplanned
readmission measures
from hospitalization
for AMI
CMS Hospital
Compare data
Scott et. al. 2017
Central line-associated
blood infections
(CLABSI)
Research
Question 1
Observed cases of
central-line associated
blood infections
CMS Hospital
Compare data
Silvera 2017
Operating Margin Research
Question 2
Net operating income
divided by total
operating revenue
AHA financial data Gapenski 2012
Community Benefits Research
Question 3
% total community
benefits divided by
total expenditures
AHA financial data
(total operating
expenditures)
IRS 990 Schedule
H (Guidestar)
Leider et. al. 2017,
Young et. al. 2018
Independent
High Integration All (0/1) if has GPWW,
MSO, ISM,
Foundation, Equity
AHA data Madison 2004
Low Integration All (0/1) if has IPA,
OPHO, CPHO
AHA data Madison 2004
Controls (Hospital Characteristics, Market Characteristics)
Beds All Number of hospital
beds
AHA data Goes and Zhan
1995, Singh et. al.
2018
Teaching Status All Yes/No indication of
teaching hospital
AHA data Morrisey et. al.
1996
System Affiliation All Yes/No indication AHA data Bai and Anderson
2016
Rurality All Yes/No, rural hospital
designation
AHA data Goes and Zhan
1995, Morrisey et.
al. 1996
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Case Mix Index All Case Mix index for
discharge, average
diagnostic related
group relative weight
per hospital
CMS files Singh et. al. 2018
Managed Care All i. Number of HMO
Contracts
ii. Number of PPO
Contracts
AHA Wang et. al. 2001
Medicare Percent All Medicare days as
percent of total
inpatient days
CMS files Borah et. al. 2012
Market Competition All Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index based on
admitted patients
AHA Singh et. al. 2018
State All Number assigned to
separate states
AHA date Singh et. al. 2018
Wage Index All Wage index provided
by CMS
CMS files Wang et. al. 2001,
Singh et. al. 2018
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APPENDIX B
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS
Figure 1B. Distribution of AMI 30 Day Mortality Rate
The distribution of the dependent
variable, AMI 30 Day Mortality Rate, is
graphed in Figure 1B. Further testing for
normality showed that AMI 30 Day
Mortality Rate was not normally
distributed. The skewness, kurtosis test
has a p-value below 0.05; therefore, the
null hypothesis that the distribution of AMI 30 Day Mortality Rate is rejected and the data
distribution is not normal. Table 1B shows the results from the skewness, kurtosis test for the
dependent variables.
Figure 2B. Distribution of AMI 30 Day Readmission Rate
Figure 2B. shows the distribution
of the AMI 30 day readmission
rate. This distribution was not
normal as shown by the tests for
skewness and kurtosis in the
table below.
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Figure 3B. Distribution of CLABSI
Figure 3B shows the
distribution of CLABSI. The
figure shows that there is a
large amount of 0’s for the
CLABSI score for the
hospitals sample. There were
499 hospitals with a score of 0
out of the 1750 hospitals with
a reported score. The score reflects how often a hospital has a patient with a CLABSI
compared to other hospitals. This distribution can be characterized as semicontinuous with
the 0’s being real (Su et. al. 2009, Neelon et. al. 2016). A two-part model for semicontinous
data with right skewed positive data was the analysis of choice. A Tobit model was not
chosen because the data contained true 0’s and not 0’s due to truncated data. Belotti et. al.’s
two part model (twopm) was used to perform the analysis of the CLABSI dependent variable
(Belotti et. al. 2015). This model first runs a logistic regression on the binary outcome of the
dependent variable being 0 and the dependent variable being greater than 0 (1) (Belotti et. al.
2015). An appropriate regression is fit for the positive dependent variables (Belotti et. al.
2015).
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Figure 4B. Distribution of Operating Margin
Figure 4B shows the
distribution of the
dependent variable
operating margin.
Table 1B below
shows that the
distribution of
operating margin is
not normal.
Figure 5B. Distribution of Percent Community Benefits
Figure 5B shows the
distribution of the Percent
Community Benefits with the
skewness and kurtosis test
below. Both show that the
distribution is not normal.
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Table 1B below has the outcome for the skewness and kurtosis tests for the dependent
variables along with the results for the Shapiro-Francia test for normality (Shapiro and
Francia 1972).
Table 1B. Normality tests of dependent variables
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for
Normality
Joint
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis)
adj
ch2(2)
Prob>chi2
AMI 30 Mort 1441 0.056 0.15 6.26 0.043
AMI 30 Readmission 1342 0.011 0 21.85 0
CLABSI 1750 0 0 - 0
Operating Margin 1757 0 0 - 0
Percent Community Benefits 930 0 0 - 0
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal
data
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
AMI 30 Mort 1441 0.997 2.39 2.04 0.021
AMI 30 Readmission 1342 0.993 6.27 4.29 0
CLABSI 1750 0.59 451.8 14.5 0.00001
Operating Margin 1757 0.84 180 12.3 0.00001
Percent Community Benefits 930 0.68 202..31 12.12 0.00001
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APPENDIX C
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
Tables 1C, 2C, and 3C below contain the results for White’s test of the residuals to
understand if the residuals were homoscedastic. The CLABSI Score analysis was done using
the twopm coding, for a two part analysis to factor in the large amount of 0’s as actual values
of the CLABSI Score. After the twopm analysis, Stata would not allow for a White’s test of
the residuals (White 1980). Instead, the residuals where calculated and graphed to visually
inspect that the residuals were not normal after regression with the log transformed CLABSI
Score. The graph of the residuals for the CLABSI score residuals after each regression are in
Figures 1C through 3C below.
Table 1C. Homoskedasticity test of residuals for regression of Physician
Hospital Organizations with High Integration
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity v Ha: unrestricted
heteroscedasticity
Variable chi2 (172) Prob>chi2
AMI 30 Mort Residuals 180.67 0.31
AMI 30 Readmission 236.31 0.0007
Operating Margin 372.5 0
Percent Community Benefits 103.06 1.00
Table 2C. Homoskedasticity test of residuals for regression of Physician
Hospital Organizations with High Integration Only
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity v Ha: unrestricted
heteroscedasticity
Variable chi2 (172) Prob>chi2
AMI 30 Mort Residuals 182.2 0.28
AMI 30 Readmission 230.3 0.0017
Operating Margin 392.4 0
Percent Community Benefits 113.7 1.00
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Table 3C. Homoskedasticity test of residuals for regression of Physician
Hospital Organizations with Low Integration Only
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity v Ha: unrestricted
heteroscedasticity
Variable chi2 (172) Prob>chi2
AMI 30 Mort Residuals 173.5 0.45
AMI 30 Readmission 218.5 0.0082
Operating Margin 337.8 0
Percent Community Benefits 97.0 1.00
Figure 1C. Distribution of Residuals (CLABSI High Integration)
Figure 1C shows the distribution of the residuals of the regression for the CLABSI Score as
dependent variable and the independent variable of interest being physician hospital
organizations with high integration.
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Figure 2C. Distribution of Residuals (CLABSI High Integration Only)
Figure 2C shows the distribution of the residuals of the regression for the CLABSI Score as
dependent variable and the independent variable of interest being physician hospital
organizations with high integration only and with no presence of physician hospital
organizations with low integration.
Figure 3C. Distribution of Residuals (CLABSI Low Integration Only)
Figure 3C shows the distribution of the residuals of the regression for the CLABSI Score as
dependent variable and the independent variable of interest being physician hospital
organizations with low integration only and with no presence of physician hospital
organizations with high integration.
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APPENDIX D
U.S. CENSUS REGIONS
The AHA provided data regarding which state is grouped into which U.S. Census Region.
Below is a table of the regions and the states in each region.
CENSUS DIVISION 1: NEW ENGLAND CENSUS DIVISION 6: WEST NORTH CENTRAL
Maine Minnesota
New Hampshire Iowa
Vermont Missouri
Massachusetts North Dakota
Rhode Island South Dakota
Connecticut Nebraska
CENSUS DIVISION 2: MID ATLANTIC Kansas
New York CENSUS DIVISION 7: WEST SOUTH CENTRAL
New Jersey Arkansas
Pennsylvania Louisiana
CENSUS DIVISION 3: SOUTH ATLANTIC Oklahoma
Delaware Texas
Maryland CENSUS DIVISION 8: MOUNTAIN
District of Columbia Montana
Virginia Idaho
West Virginia Wyoming
North Carolina Colorado
South Carolina New Mexico
Georgia Arizona
Florida Utah
CENSUS DIVISION 4: EAST NORTH CENTRAL Nevada
Ohio CENSUS DIVISON 9: PACIFIC
Indiana Washington
Illinois Oregon
Michigan California
Wisconsin Alaska
CENSUS DIVISION 5: EAST SOUTH CENTRAL Hawaii
Kentucky ASSOCIATED AREAS (REGION 10 for this study)
Tennessee Marshall Islands
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Alabama Puerto Rico
Mississippi Virgin Islands
Guam
American Samoa
Northern Mariana Islands
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